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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The United States Constitution, Amendment 5: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
The United States Constitution, Amendment 14: 
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
ii 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11(g): The Record on Appeal. 
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made or when 
transcript is unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or 
trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, or if tiie appellant is impecunious 
and unable to afford a transcript in a civil case, the appellant may prepare a 
statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including 
recollection. The statement shall be served on the appellee, who may serve 
objections or propose amendments within 10 days after service. The statement and 
any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the trial court for 
settlement and approval and, as settled and approved, shall be included by the 
clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24: Briefs. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of 
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact 
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. 
iii 
A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the 
request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1: General Provisions. 
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the courts of the state 
of Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable 
at law or in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except as governed by 
other rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legislature and except as 
stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47: Jurors. 
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to 
conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the 
examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties or their attorneys 
to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is material and proper or 
shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions of the parties 
or their attorneys as is material and proper. Prior to examining the jurors, the court 
may make a preliminary statement of the case. The court may permit the parties or 
their attorneys to make a preliminary statement of the case, and notify the parties 
in advance of trial. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a)(1): New trials; amendments of judgment, 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to 
all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following 
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causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if ope has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and coriclusions of law or make new 
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a ripw judgment: 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, juify or adverse party, or any 
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from 
having a fair trial. 
v 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT SHOULD GRANT A REHEARING BECAUSE PLAINTIFF 
WAS EFFECTIVELY DENIED HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHT OF APPEAL 
1. Introduction 
It is well established that "Our Constitution assures the right of appeal in all cases 
to the end that claimed errors or abuses may be reviewed by another tribunal." Hoyer v. 
State, 2009 UT 38, f 14, 212 P.3d 547. In the present case, due process and substantial 
justice were effectively denied Plaintiff Kearl due to the Court of Appeals refusal to 
review the merits of several of his claims. This refusal had a "real . . . chilling effect on 
the constitutional right to appeal" and receive due process of law. State v. Yazzie, 2009 
UT 14, 203 P.3d 984; see also State v. Samora, 2004 UT 79, 99 P.3d 858; Wood v. 
Turner, 18 Utah 2d 229, 419 P.2d 634. 
The Court of Appeals determined that five of the issues raised by Plaintiff Kearl 
could not be properly decided: two due to an alleged failure to include an adequate 
transcript on appeal, two due to preservation issues at the trial court level and one due to 
"inadequate briefing." By refusing to adequately consider the facts of the case and 
applicable law for each issue raised, error was committed and Plaintiff Kearl was 
effectively deprived his constitutional right to due process of law. Hoyer, 2009 UT at f^ 
14; State ex rel M. W., 2000 UT 79, Tf 8, 12 P.3d 80. 
In evaluating each of these errors, it is important to remember that the statutes 
implementing "the right of appeal are liberally construed," Hoyer, 2009 UT at Tf 14. This 
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Court has ruled that "undue stress on technicalities wliere others are not adversely 
affected" is not in accord with the general objectives of appeal and that "mere technical 
defects should not defeat the right of appeal," at least in $ome instances, so long as the 
essential requisites are met. Id, see also Wood, 18 Uta|i 2d 229. Additionally, it is 
important to recall that if it is shown that even one of the issues raised violated Plaintiff 
Kearl's right to due process, he is entitled to relief. State v\ McClellan, 2009 UT 50, 216 
P.3d 956. Accordingly, it is essential to evaluate the merits 6f each claim individually. 
2. The Court of Appeals Erred In Determining The iksue Of Jury Selection Was 
Not Properly Preserved. 
a. The Court of Appeals incorrectly determined that Plaintiff Kearl 
insufficiently preserved his claim regarding vojr dire adequacy. 
The Court of Appeals did not consider and rul0 on Plaintiff Kearl's claim 
regarding the adequacy of voir dire because the court allege^ that Plaintiff Kearl failed to 
preserve the issue at the trial court level. The court indicated the "Plaintiff never stated 
why his proposed questions regarding alcohol were relevant" and accordingly the issue 
was not preserved. 
Although there are exceptions, usually to preserve an issue for appeal "the issue 
must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trihl court has an opportunity to 
rule on that issue." Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, \ 15, 164 P.3d 366. Three factors are 
considered in determining if the trial court had adequate opportunity to rule on the issue: 
1) whether the issue was raised in a timely manner, 2) whetjher it was specifically raised 
and 3) whether there was a presentation of evidence or relevant legal authority. Id. 
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The purpose of the preservation requirement is twofold: 1) to give the trial court 
an "opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it" and 2) to 
prevent a defendant from being "permitted to forego making an objection with the 
strategy of enhancing the defendant's chances of acquittal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 
111-13, 10 P.3d 346, citing State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989). 
In the present case, the trial court had an adequate opportunity to rule on the 
claimed error by deciding whether the proposed voir dire questions should be included in 
the jury instruction; accordingly the issue was preserved. On October 22, 2007, Plaintiff 
Kearl filed a timely amended proposed jury questionnaire which added three questions 
designed to elicit juror bias towards alcoholism.1 During the corresponding pre-trial 
conference on October 24, 2007, Plaintiff Kearl argued that the voir dire questions 
regarding alcohol should be used. Plaintiff Kearl requested that the questions be added to 
the jury questionnaire because he was concerned that given the strong religious bias 
towards alcohol in the community, some jurors might be prejudiced by the Plaintiffs use 
of alcohol to self-medicate which would undermine his right to an impartial trial. 
The Court of Appeals asserted that Plaintiff Kearl did not properly preserve the 
voir dire issue because he failed to specifically state in the record "why his proposed 
questions regarding alcohol were relevant." Under the Pratt test cited by the court, 
however, a specific statement regarding why an issue was raised is not required for 
1
 The questions included: "Do you drink alcohol?", "Does any member of your family 
drink alcohol" and "Would you have a hard time being impartial toward a party if they 
drink alcohol?" 
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preservation, only the showing of "supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." 
Pratt, 2007 U T a H 15. 
Unfortunately, due to a clerical error, the pre-trial hearing was not recorded and is 
unavailable to further demonstrate that supporting evidence and relevant authority was 
presented. Additionally, no clear standard exists for determining what is sufficient 
supporting evidence or relevant authority. However, in Hofer, this Court determined that 
statutes implementing "the right of appeal are liberally bonstrued and applied in the 
furtherance of justice." 2009 UT at \ 14. 
The record clearly indicates that Plaintiff Kearl specifically raised the issue of 
whether questions should be used to elicit potential jurors bias toward alcohol when he 
submitted his proposed jury questionnaire and discussed th4 issue at the pre-trial hearing. 
Accordingly, the purposes and requirements of the preservation requirement were 
satisfied, since the trial court had an opportunity to address tfhe claimed error and Plaintiff 
Kearl did not forego making an objection with the strategy of enhancing his position. 
Holgate, 2000 UT at J^ 13. Since the issue was 1) raided in a timely manner, 2) 
specifically raised and 3) evidence or relevant legal authority was presented, the court 
should have considered the claim. 
b. Plaintiff should not have been prohibited from (supplementing the record. 
Since the court failed to record the pre-trial hearjng which would have best 
illustrated the required supporting evidence and relevant authority to preserve the 
adequacy of voir dire on appeal, Plaintiff Kearl should havej been allowed to supplement 
the record as prescribed in the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 11(g) of the Utah 
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Rules of Appellate Procedure applies if there is no transcript or recording of a hearing 
available. Rule 11(g) indicates that "If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a 
hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable . . . the appellant may prepare a 
statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including 
recollection." 
Although a time limit for filing under Rule 11(e) exists, no corresponding 
requirement is placed on creating a supplemental record under Rule 11(g). Rule 11(g) 
indicates that the "appellant may" supplement the record and the only specified 
requirement is that the "the statement shall be served on the Appellee" and "shall be 
submitted to the trial court." Id. 
As in Hoyer, if there was any question regarding whether the appellant should be 
allowed to supplement the record, the court should have "liberally construed [the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure] to secure the just determination of every action" so that 
there was not "undue stress on technicalities where others are not adversely affected." 
/foyer, 2009 UT at If 15. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established that when the record cannot be 
supplemented and is essential to appellate review, then a new trial should be ordered. 
State v. Tunzi, 2000 UT 38, 998 P.2d 816 (part of trial tape missing) ; S.T. v. State (State 
ex rel F.T.), 2003 UT App 81 (unpublished) (part of trial tape missing). West Valley City 
v. Roberts, 993 P.2d 252 (Ut App 1999). The appellate court in West Valley City 
2
 Arguably Rule 11(h) could also apply to clarify the minute entry in the record, but the 
distinction in this instance is irrelevant since under either 11(g) or 1(h) the proper remedy 
is still for the record to be supplemented. 
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determined that "[d]ue process requires that there be a record adequate to review specific 
claims of error already raised" and that "a new hearing is Appropriate when a record is so 
incomplete that a person is denied meaningful judicial rev jew." 1999 UTApp 358, Tf 14-
15, 993 P.2d 252. However, there must first be a showing that "(1) the absence or 
incompleteness of the record prejudices the appellant!, (2) the record cannot be 
satisfactorily reconstructed (i.e., by affidavits or other documentary evidence), and (3) the 
appellant timely requests the relevant portion of the record." Id; see also State v. T.R. 
(State ex rel S.B.), 2002 UT App 178 (unpublished) (because a statement could not be 
prepared under Rule 11(g) to supplement a transcript following equipment failure, the 
court ruled that a new trial was necessary). 
In the present case, Plaintiff Kearl filed a motioh to supplement the pre-trial 
hearing, as allowed under Rule 11(g), after realizing that tljie record was incomplete due 
to a clerical error. On Sep 11, 2009, the court denied the ifiotion to supplement without 
any explanation. 
In the decision filed May 13, 2010, the Court of Appeals then indicated that 
several of Plaintiff Kearl's claims could not be decided on appeal because of preservation 
issues related to the same portion of the record which the cdurt had previously refused to 
allow Plaintiff Kearl to supplement. 
The Court of Appeals refused to consider Plaintiff Kearl's claim that the trial court 
committed reversible error by failing to ask specific voir dir^ questions designed to elicit 
juror bias towards alcohol since the issue was not properly preserved. The court's 
decision constituted clear error and was a far departure fron^ i the usual course of judicial 
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proceedings since it was the court's refusal to allow Plaintiff Kearl to supplement the 
record that prohibited him from being able to fully show that the required supporting 
evidence and relevant legal authority was presented. 
Defendant Okelberry argued that allowing Plaintiff Kearl to supplement the record 
under rule 11(g) would be prejudicial. However, as in Hoyer, any small inconvenience or 
prejudice that Defendant Okelberry may have suffered would have been inconsequential 
compared to the effective loss of Plaintiff Kearl's constitutional right to appeal. Hoyer, 
2009 UT at 114. 
Furthermore if a statement could not adequately be prepared under Rule 11(g), as 
Defendant Okelberry contends, a new trial should have been reordered since the Court of 
Appeals determined that the lack of evidence was critical in evaluating several of the 
claims raised. State v. Tumi, 2000 UT 38, 998 P.2d 816; West Valley City, 1999 UT App 
at f 1. It is clear that Plaintiff Kearl was prejudiced by the incomplete record given the 
decision by the Court of Appeals and there was no contest that Plaintiff Kearl requested 
the other available portions of the record in a timely manner. If the Court of Appeals 
denial of Plaintiff Kearl's request to supplement the record is indicative of an opinion that 
the record could not be satisfactorily reconstructed, a new trial should have been granted. 
In short, the court should determine that Plaintiffs constitutional right to 
effectively appeal should not be dismissed due to a clerical error as in In re Discipline of 
Alex. 2004 UT 81, \ 19, 99 P.3d 865 (the court determined that a clerical error dismissing 
an original appeal provided no basis to dismiss an amended appeal). 
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Plaintiff Kearl should either 1) be granted a new trial or 2) be allowed to 
supplement the record and have the case reheard. 
c. Alternately, the adequacy of voir dire was sufficiently preserved through 
the plain error and exceptional circumstances doctrine. 
Even if the preservation requirements were not met, the "exceptional 
circumstances" doctrine and "plain error" rule exist to assure an equitable outcome. 
Holgate, 2000 UT at f 13; State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113. The exceptional 
circumstance rule applies to "rare procedural anomalies" and the plain error doctrine 
applies when 1) an error exists; 2) the error should have been obvious to the court; and 3) 
the error is harmful, for example "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for the appellant, or . . . cbnfidence in the verdict is 
undermined." Holgate, 2000 UT at % 13. 
Although not directly raised on appeal, the existence of exceptional circumstances 
and plain error is implied in the Brief of the Appellant, Plaintiff Kearl. Although the 
standard is unclear, the failure of the trial court to record the pre-trial hearing followed by 
the refusal of the appellate court to allow Plaintiff Kearl to supplement the record 
arguably constituted as a rare procedural anomaly that wo^ild qualify as an exceptional 
circumstance. 
Additionally, the plain error doctrine is applicable because: 1) an error existed 
since the court refused to include the voir dire questions, 2|) the court should have been 
aware of the error given the dominant religious prejudice against alcohol, the high 
probably that Plaintiff Kearl's alcohol use would be discussed during the trial and the 
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legal precedent indicating that courts should ask specific questions and err on the side of 
including juror questions and 3) The error was harmful as Mrs. Armstrong testified (she 
testified that Mr. Harward, a fellow juror, was in fact biased by Plaintiff Kearl's use of 
alcohol to self-medicate). 
The trial court's determination to not include questions designed to elicit juror bias 
toward alcohol based upon religious belief was error. The standard for review of a trial 
judge's management of jury voir dire is abuse of discretion. A trial court commits 
reversible error when, "considering the totality of the questioning, counsel is not afforded 
an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors." Barrett v. 
Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 98, quoting Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Rule 47(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that if a court decides to 
conduct the examination of prospective jurors it "shall permit the parties or their 
attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is material and proper 
or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions of the parties or 
their attorneys as is material and proper." 
In the criminal case Johnson v. Armontrout, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
indicated that "due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on 
the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences 
and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen." 961 F.2d 748, 752 
(8th Cir. Mo. 1992). 
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To ensure due process, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that judges should 
ask specific voir dire questions and err on the side of including proposed questions 
"because a prospective juror cannot know much about the case at the time of voir dire" so 
"a juror cannot anticipate how he will react when asked to decide a case once all the facts 
are known." State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951. In State v. Saunders, the Court 
indicated that "although a trial judge has discretion in limiting voir dire examination, that 
discretion must be liberally exercised in favor of allowing counsel to elicit necessary 
information for ferreting out bias" because "the fairness pf a trial may indeed depend 
upon the right of counsel to ask voir dire questions designed to discover and explore 
biases that would affect a jurorfs decision." 1999 UT at f 35; see also Evans, 824 P.2d 
460. 
Accordingly, "trial counsel should be given considerable latitude in asking voir 
dire questions, especially in view of the fact that only counsel will, at the beginning, have 
a clear overview of the entire case and the type of evidence to be adduced" and there is an 
"all too prevalent practice of avoiding any real inquiry into possible bias." Id. 
As previously stated, in the present case Plaintiff Kearl submitted questions 
designed to elicit juror bias toward alcohol as allowed per Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The trial court should have permitted Plaintiff Kearl to ask specific 
questions to ferret out alcohol bias, but instead decided to use general questions which 
did not address specific prejudices toward alcoholism. Th& failure of the trial court to 
allow the specific questions was error. The trial court should have known that given the 
dominant religious prejudice against alcohol and the high probably that Plaintiff Kearl5s 
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alcohol use would be discussed during the trial, that it was error for the court to not ask 
specific questions and err on the side of inclusion as required under Sanders, 1999 UT at 
1135. 
Plaintiff Kearl was in fact biased by the error because one of the jurors, Mr. 
Harward, who was the sixth vote required to return a verdict, would not find for the 
Plaintiff because he "drank alcohol and did not hold to Mr. Hardward's religious 
standards, which he cited several times . . . even though these facts had no relation to the 
injury and how It occurred." (R. at 811-13.) Even the trial judge admitted had he known 
of a jurors "strong feelings and opinions" 3 against plaintiff he would have excluded him. 
Since the court 1) erred in excluding the proposed questions regarding alcohol 
bias, 2) should have known that the exclusion was error and 3) the exclusion did in fact 
affect the "the reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant" by 
altering the sixth vote, plain error occurred. 
3. Plaintiff Kearl Correctly Requested That The Trial Court Conduct A Post-Trial 
Evidentiary Hearing To Investigate Juror Bias. 
Similarly, the appellate court refused to consider Plaintiff Kearl's claim that the 
trial court should have conducted a post-trial evidentiary hearing to investigate the 
allegations of juror bias. The Court of Appeals determined that the issue of a post-trial 
evidentiary hearing was not preserved since Plaintiff Kearl allegedly failed to request that 
3
 "You're right, Mr. Hatch, if it had come to my attention, along with the attorneys, that a 
panel member, a potential juror, had strong feelings and opinions with respect to religious 
beliefs and evidence that would be contrary to that potential juror's own attitudes and 
feelings about religious beliefs, we would all have excluded him." Oral Arguments, p. 13, 
Feb. 20, 2008. 
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the trial court conduct a post-trial to evaluate juror bias ar}d instead just requested a new 
trial. 
Under Rule 59(a)(1) a court can order a new triali based on "irregularity of the 
proceedings of the...jury." Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1). On December 10, 2007, Plaintiff 
Kearl filed a Memorandum in support of Motion for a New Trial. In the motion, Plaintiff 
Kearl argued that under West v. Holley a juror could be challenged post-trial "based on 
the jurors 'misstatement or omissions' during voir dire." Plaintiff Kearl urged that the 
court follow West and investigate the juror's bias during a post-trial hearing. An entire 
section of Plaintiffs Kearl memorandum was entitled "Misconduct of Juror W. Gary 
Harward" and specifically addressed the need to address thq allegations of juror bias. 
Since Plaintiff Kearl did request a post-trial evidentiary hearing to investigate 
juror bias, which was preserved in the record, the Court of Appeals should have evaluated 
the Plaintiffs claim. 
4. The Court Was Provided With Plaintiff Kearl's Expert Witness Transcript 
Which Should Have Been Considered In Evaluating Attorney Misconduct. 
The Court of Appeals incorrectly determined that it ctould not adequately evaluate 
the prejudice that resulted from Defendant Oakelberr's wrongful use of an exhibit during 
the cross-examination of Plaintiff Kearl's expert witness, pr. France, because "Plaintiff 
has not provided us with a transcript of the witness's testimony." 
A transcript of the witness's testimony was provided <pn pages 5-11 of the jury trial 
for November 5, 2007. Dr. France's answers are indicated £s the witness answering the 
questions. 
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Since the requested transcript was provided, the Court of Appeals should have 
considered the transcript in evaluating the exhibit's prejudicial effect. 
5. The Court Erred in Prohibiting Plaintiff Kearl From Supplementing The Record 
For The Hearing On His Motion To Exclude Dr. Smith's Testimony. 
The Court of Appeals indicated that it could not accurately determine if the trial 
court erred in 1) qualifying Dr. Smith as an expert and 2) excluding evidence that Dr. 
Smith was hired by an insurance company because a transcript of the hearing for Plaintiff 
Kearl's motion to exclude Dr. Smith's testimony was not included in the record on appeal 
and a transcript of Dr. Smith's testimony at trial was also not provided. 
The hearing on Plaintiff Kearl's motion to exclude Dr. Smith's testimony was part 
of the October 24, 2007 pretrial-hearing that was not recorded due to a clerical error. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff Kearl was unable to provide a copy of the transcript. 
Rule 11(g) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure applies if there is no 
transcript or recording of a hearing available. Rule 11(g) indicates that "If no report of the 
evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable . . . 
the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best 
available means, including recollection." 
The Court of Appeals states in footnote 2 of its decision that "[e]ven assuming that 
Plaintiffs allegation is correct [that the pre-trial hearing was not recorded], it does not 
change our analysis" because "[w]e see nothing in the record to indicate that Plaintiff 
supplemented [the record] in the manner prescribed by rule 11(g)." 
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As previously indicated, Plaintiff Kearl was prohibited by the Court of Appeals 
from supplementing the pre-trial hearing. It is far beyond the usual course of judicial 
proceedings to refuse to allow a plaintiff to supplement tlhe record and then decline to 
evaluate the merits of the case because he failed to supplement. Additionally, a transcript 
of the hearing is not required to determine whether Dr. Smith should testify. Several 
memorandums were submitted describing Plaintiff Kearl'|s reasons for objecting to Dr. 
Smith's testimony along with several sections from Dr. Smjth's deposition. 
Since Plaintiff Kearl was prohibited from supplementing the pre-trial hearing as 
requested and the information was not necessary, the Court of Appeals should have either 
allowed Plaintiff Kearl to supplement or considered the rr^erits of the claim without the 
supplementation. 
6. The Court Should Interpret Rules Regarding Sufficiency Of Briefing Liberally. 
Lastly, the Court of Appeals declined to address the failure of the trial court to 
include Plaintiff Kearl's proposed jury instruction regarding alcohol as a pre-existing 
condition since the issue was inadequately briefed according to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
It is important to remember that limitations placed oh the right to appeal are to be 
"liberally construed." Hoyer, 2009 UT at Tf 14. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that 
there should not be "undue stress on technicalities where others are not adversely 
affected."/*/. 
14 
Although it is true that Plaintiff Kearl failed to include legal authority regarding 
the necessity of including the jury instruction per Rule 24, the Court of Appeals should 
liberally construe the rule in favor of allowing Plaintiff Kearl his right of appeal. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals had the proper standard before it. Appelle's 
Brief at 5. "All parties are entitled to have their theory of the case submitted to the jury 
in the Court's instructions provided there was competent evidence to support them" 
Paulos v. Covenant Transport, Inc., 2004 UT App 35, paragraphs 11, 27; State v. Low, 
2008 UT 58, paragraphs 25, 27, 29, 192 P.3d 867. The appellant must also show that the 
failure was prejudicial in that "confidence in the jury's verdict is undermined" and "there 
is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would have been a result more 
favorable to the complaining party." Jenkins v. Jenkins, 2008 UT App 
454*2(unpublished), citing Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68, paragraph 16, 987 P.2d 
588. See Appellee's Brief at 5. 
In this case, appellant Kearl cited to the record showing the issue of alcohol was 
introduced at trial. Appellant's Reply Brief at 27. In addition, in his Motion to 
Supplement the Record appellant Kearl requested that the record be supplemented with 
the testimony of Dr. Jared Clegg (Kearl's physician) and Lana Marshall (family member) 
who testified about appellant Kearl's self-medication using alcohol, and the opening 
arguments to the jury which outline the evidence regarding alcohol. Last, the affidavit of 
the jury foreman, Kay Armstrong, showed prejudice against appellant Kearl's alcohol use 
played a prominent role in the jury deliberations and was the basis of at least one vote 
against Kearl by juror Gary Harward, who represented the critical sixth juror vote. 
15 
Based on the above, the court should allow supplementation of the record and 
address the merits of failure to include proposed jury instructions. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff Kearl was effectively deprived his right of appeal due to the refusal of the 
appellate court to consider many of the substantial merits of his claim. The refusal 
constituted a far departure from the usual course of judicial proceedings. The court 
should have either 1) allowed Plaintiff Kearl to supplement the pre-trial hearing as 
allowed per Rule 11(g), 2) found the issues to be properly preserved and considered the 
merits of the claim or 3) ordered a new trial. Additionally, the court should have read the 
sections of the record provided that allegedly were not submitted. By refusing to 
adequately consider the facts of the case and applicable law for each issue, error was 
committed and Plaintiff Kearl was effectively deprived his constitutional right to due 
process of law. 
Pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure 35 (c) if the court grants appellant 
Kearl's petition for rehearing, he requests that the case be restored to the calendar for 
argument. 
DATED this /tT day of June 2010. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Denton M. Hatch 
Counsel for Appellant 
Mj4- fUJk U^ T^^k^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for 
Rehearing on this J2) day of June 2010 to the following: 
Karra J. Porter 
Christensen & Jensen, P.C. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Secretary 
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PER CURIAM: 
*1 This case is before the court on Appellant's motion for summary reversal on the basis that a portion of the trial on t 
petition to terminate Appellant's rights was not tape recorded and, therefore, cannot be transcribed. Approximately fifty-sev 
minutes of the almost three hour trial is missing. The missing portion contains much of the State's cross-examination 
AvppeTlant. Appellant contends, pursuant to State v Tunzi
 f 2000 UT 38,113, 998 P.2d 516, that the remedy is a new trial becau 
re-creation of the record is not practical because of the nature of Appellant's issues on appeal. Appellant was represented I 
different counsel on appeal than at trial. His claims on appeal are ineffective assistance of counsel and sufficiency oft! 
evidence supporting termination of his parental rights. Appellant argues, as in Tunzi, that a substantial portion of the evident 
is missing and that a detailed record is crucial to determination of his appeal. See id. 
Appellee argues that Tunzi is distinguishable from this case because, in this calse, it is not a significant portion of the evidenc 
missing. Appellee argues that Appellant should be required to attempt to re-create the record pursuant to rule life) of the Uta 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. In support of its argument, Appellee submits Affidavits of the Assistant Attorney General an< 
Guardian Ad Litem, who participated in the trial, as to their recollection of the evidence. Citing the three part test articulate* 
in West Valley City v Roberts, 1999 UT App 358,11 11.993 P.2d 252, Appellee arfeues that Appellant has not demonstrated tha 
the flaw in the record prejudices him. Appellee also claims that Appellant has not adequately shown that the record cannot b< 
re-created. Roberts, however, is distinguishable from this case because it involved an administrative hearing in which the Cit> 
had an affirmative statutory obligation to record the proceedings. Moreover, tnis court determined in Roberts that Appellani 
had met the requirements to entitle him to a new hearing because the city's failurq to record the proceedings "created a situation 
which denied appellants meaningful judicial review." Id. at If 17. 
FN1. The affidavit of the Guardian Ad Litem consists primarily of ijiis conclusion that the cross-examination of 
Appellant was detrimental to his case rather than helpful. 
We conclude that Appellant has adequately demonstrated that a substantial 
missing from the record and that, because of the nature of the issues raised on a] 
(one-third) portion of the evidence at trial is 
the absence of a detailed record deprives ppeal 
Appellant of an adequate appeal. 
NQ reverse the order terminating Appellant's parental rights and remand for a hew trial on the State's petition to terminate 
>arental rights. 
Itah App.,2003. 
tateexrel.F.T. 
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PER CURIAM. 
*1 This case is before the court on Appellant's motion for a new trial. A transcript of the trial in this matter was requested a 
this court received certification from the court reporter that a transcript of the trial could not be prepared because of equipm* 
failure. Only one microphone appears to have been recording. Neither the microphone for the judge, nor the microphone fort 
witnesses was recording. This court then required the parties to attempt to create an agreed upon statement, pursuant to Ri 
11(g) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, trial counsel submtted an affidavit indicating that he has invest 
thirty hours attempting such a statement, but is unable to create a statement of evidence. Also, trial counsel indicates that \ 
recommendation to appellate counsel, based on the evidence presented at triil, was to argue insufficiency of the evidence < 
appeal. 
Appellee argues that Appellant has not followed the procedures outlined iib rule 11(g), by not serving Appellee withth 
statement and presenting the statement of trial counsel to the trial court to settle the matter. However, the statement provide 
by trial counsel is not a proposed statement of evidence, it is a statement that, under the circumstances ^ re-creation ofth 
evidence is impossible. Therefore, to present the statement to the trial court woiild serve no purpose and is not required. 
In State v. Tumi, 2000 UT 38, 998 P.2d 816, the supreme court indicated that, When sufficiency of the evidence is the issue oi 
appeal and an accurate record is critical, and when a major part of the record is missing, the burden and futility of attempting t< 
recreate the record necessitate a new trial. See id. at % 3. The affidavit of trial coiinsel demonstrates the impossibility and futilitj 
of further attempting to re-create the record in this matter. Appellee does not dispute the condition of the recording asserted b> 
the reporter. Given the circumstances, a new trial is required and is granted by this court. This appeal is accordingly dismissec 
as a result of this court's ruling. 
Utah App.,2002. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official Publication) 
BENCH Judge: 
*1 Defendant Alan Jenkins appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for summary judgment, denial of his motion for lea\ 
to amend his answer, and rejection of certain proposed jury instructions. We aflfirm. 
The denial of Defendant's motion for summary judgment is not appealable. uUtah case law suggests that we will entertain a 
appeal of a denial of a motion for summary judgment only if it involves a legal xs^xxe.^ Norman dean v Hanson Equip., Inc., 200 
UT App 382,11 13. 174 P.3d K cert, granted, 187 P.3d 232 (Utah 2008) (No. 20071006). Defendant raised two legal theories in hi 
motion for summary judgment that he claimed barred Plaintiffs quiet title actionl: the statute of frauds and issue preclusion. It i 
apparent from the record that there were disputed facts with respect to both issues, namely, whether Plaintiff had entered int< 
an oral agreement that had been fully performed and thereby removed her action from the statute of frauds, see generally Ortoi 
v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254. 1259 (Utah 1998), and whether Plaintiff had manifested an intention that her stipulated divorce decre< 
be binding as to the issue of property ownership in a subsequent action, see generally Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc. 
2000 UT 93, H 43, 16 P.3d 1214. Because these disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment and the denial o 
the summary judgment motion did not involve purely legal issues, we do not review the denial of Defendant's motion fo 
summary judgment. 
"The standard of review of a denial to amend pleadings is abuse of discretion." Kasco Servs. Cory, v Benson, 831 P.2d 86. 92 
(Utah 1992). The Utah Supreme Court 'whas generally focused on three factors in deciding whether a district court properly 
granted [or denied] a motion for leave to amend: (1) timeliness; (2) prejudice; and (3) justification/' Swan Creek Vill 
Homeowners Ass'n v Warne, 2006 UT 22, If 20, 134 P.3d 1122.6w[M]otions to amenld are typically deemed untimely when they are 
filed in the advanced procedural stages of the litigation process, such as after the completion of discovery ... [or] on the eve of 
a scheduled trial date." Kelly v. Hard Money Funding. Inc., 2004 UT App 44, H 29. 87 P.3d 734; see also Fishbaugh v. Utah 
Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403, 408-09 (Utah 1998) (concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying a 
motion to amend where the motion was filed following two different continuances of the trial date and only forty-four days 
before the third scheduled trial date). "The general rule regarding prejudice is tl^ at an amendment should be denied when the 
opposing side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adji^ dicated for which he [or she] had no time to 
prepare." Swan Creek, 2006 UT 22, H 21 (alteration in original) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). Furthennore, a 
party can establish justification for the delay in bringing a motion to amend plead ngs where the party can demonstrate that the 
delay was not "due to a dilatory motive, a bad faith effort..., or unreasonable neglect in terms of pleading preparation," or that 
he party had minimal "prior knowledge" of the events prompting the desired amendment. Kelly, 2004 UT App 44, f 38. 
r2 The trial court denied Defendant's motion to amend his answer for untimelindss because the motion was brought after the 
ompletion of discovery and just a couple months before the scheduled trial, 4hich had already been continued from a prior 
late. Additionally, the trial court found that Plaintiff would be prejudiced by' having to respond to an affirmative defense 
without the opportunity to conduct discovery on the issue and that Defendant failed to offer any persuasive justification for 
is delay in bringing the motion. In light of the late timing of Defendant's motipn and the trial court's findings regarding the 
elay and potential prejudice, we conclude that the trial court did not exceed the discretion afforded it by denying Defendant's 
lotion to amend. 
b2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.as... 2/3 
• rvo LU me nnai issue, "[Tjailure to give requested jury instructions constitutes reversible error only jf their omission t^ nHs 
mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the law" State 
Strinsham. 2001 UT App 13,11 17, 17 P.3d 1153 (internal quotation marks omitted). Prejudice to the complaining party occu 
where "there is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would havej been a result more favorable to the complain in 
party." Tinfev v. Christensen. 1999 UT 68. II 16.987 P.2d 588. "1 haj^\j^ ' 
— ^i?f 
In his briefing on appeal, Defendant offers no analysis of these factors and fails to cite any legal authority. Instead, Defendar 
makes only a general argument that the omission of his proposed instructions brecluded him from presenting his theory ofth 
case. In support of this general contention, Defendant cites the portion of the record containing his proposed jury instructions 
which include nothing more than a bare citation to a statute or a case. As aj result, it has been left to this court to makethi 
argument as to how the omission of the proposed instructions was misleading! insufficient, erroneous, or prejudicial. Because 
of the inadequacy of Defendant's briefing on this issue, see Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, H8,995 P.2d 14 ("An issue is 
inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to the burden of research and argument to the 
reviewing court." (internal quotation marks omitted)), we cannot definitively address it, see Utah R.App. P. 24(k) (allowing 
appellate courts to disregard briefs that are not in compliance with rule 24). It does appear, however, that Defendant was able to 
present his theory of the case to the jury. The testimony and evidence highlighted in his appellate brief supported his theory, 
and if the jury had believed his theory, it could have simply answered negatively pn the special verdict form. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge, and WILLIAM A. T^ORNE JR., Associate Presiding Judge. 
Utah App.,2008. 
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